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IMPACTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ON INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR UNDER RISK
Introduction
Implicit in most applications of the expected utility (EU) model is the assumption that
only the decision maker’s own income matters.  Moreover, studies that estimate risk preferences
typically measure how individuals respond to changes in the level and likelihood of having their
own income altered (Young).  The focus on own income in the EU model is consistent with the
assumption most often applied in the neoclassical economic paradigm; namely, that the identity
of participants in an economic exchange does not affect the outcome (Telser and Higinbotham).  
Recently, a burgeoning social capital literature has emphasized that relationships alter
economic outcomes.  For example, Siles, Hanson, and Robison found that positive relationships 
increased probability of loan approval in some cases by over 50 percent.   Likewise, Perry and
Robison found that farm land rarely trades outside a circle of close friends and family while
Robison, Myers, and Siles (RMS) found that farmland is discounted by nearly 8 percent when
traded among friends and is rarely exchanged between persons in an unfriendly relationship. 
These results suggest that social capital, residing in relationships, influences both access to the
farmland markets and the terms at which farmland is financed and traded.
Missing from the literature is any mention of how the social capital influences investment
under risk.  The intent of this article is to investigate the linkage.  In what follows, the social
capital literature and its applications are reviewed.  Then social capital models are related to
other models of relationships, including altruism and club models.  Next, a theoretical model that
incorporates social capital and risk is introduced and hypotheses are deduced.  Finally, survey
results are used to test the conclusions of the deductive model and the results are summarized.2 2
The findings of this paper are not unexpected.  The introduction of risk into economic
models increased their complexity and the ambiguity of their results.  To resolve the ambiguity,
more individual specific data is required, including individual and group risk preferences. 
Likewise, introduction of social capital into economic models further increases their complexity
and the ambiguity of their results.  To resolve the increased ambiguity in social capital models
requires data specific to relationships and one’s social capital.
An Introduction to Social Capital
Hanifan introduced the concept of social capital in 1916.  Since then, several scholars
have contributed to the popularity of the term and concept including, Bourdieu, Coleman,
Fukuyama, Narayan and Pritchette, Portes, Putnam, Robison and Schmid (1991), and Woolcock. 
Even before these wrote about social capital, many social scientists were aware of the concept
even though they may have called it something else.  For many, social capital is like old wine in
a new bottle, an old concept dressed up in a new name.  What is different now is that many
social scientists and problem solvers recognize their shared interest in social capital and are
talking about it with each other and across disciplines.
As scientists and practitioners from different disciplines and problem areas have shared
their applications and understandings of social capital, a richer paradigm with increased
usefulness has emerged.  The increased usefulness of the social capital paradigm has been
illustrated by its widespread applications to such diverse topics as educational achievements
(Coleman), conspicuous consumption (Frank), health care (Woh), crime and violence
(Etzioni),environmental degradation (Lanz), advertising (Tye), community development (Flora,3 3
C. and Flora, J.), economic growth (Knack and Keefer), information technology (Montague), 
trade (Fafchamp, Minten), discrimination (Loury), and poverty reduction (World Bank).
One predictable outcome of social scientists and practitioners from diverse backgrounds
sharing a common paradigm has been the emergence of different definitions of social capital. 
Robison, Schmid, and Siles (RSS) review alternative definitions and propose the following: 
"Social capital is a person’s or group’s sympathy toward another person or group that may
produce a potential benefit, advantage, and preferential treatment for another person or group of
persons beyond that expected in an exchange relationship." 
The following are consequences of social capital as defined above.  Persons or groups
have social capital when they are the objects of another person or group’s sympathetic feelings.
Persons or groups provide social capital when they have sympathetic feelings toward another
person or group.  Those who have social capital have access to resources from social capital
providers on preferential terms compared to what might be expected in arms-length
relationships.
Increases in social capital among groups and between individuals promote cooperative actions,
alter terms and levels of trade, encourage exchanges, reduce free riding, internalize externalities,
and increase investments in public or high exclusionary cost goods. 
Social capital has been criticized by some who claim that it really isn’t capital, because
there is no one definition that all scientists and practitioners accept, and because it cannot be
measured (Arrow, Solow, Durlauf).  In contrast, RSS argue that social capital really is capital
based on what most consider to be capital requirements (Smithson).  Social capital has the
potential to provide services and still maintain its identity (we can ask a friend for a favor and
still preserve our friendship).  Social capital is distinct from its services; (sympathetic feelings4 4
provided one’s friends are distinct from the favors provided).  Social capital is durable (we can
have friends for long periods of time and sometimes for life).  Most consider the potential
services of social capital to be valuable (we value friendships and make costly efforts to maintain
them).  Social capital is flexible (we find the services of friends valuable in a variety of settings). 
Social capital is partly fungible (we may ask a friend to obtain help for us from his/her friends
that we may not know).
1  And, social capital sometimes substitutes or complements other forms
of capital (our friends may help us improve the services we derive from other forms of capital). 
In essence, it is possible to view social capital as a well-defended capital conceptthat can be
placed in the capital pantheon that includes other forms of capital such as physical capital,
financial capital, human capital, cultural capital, and natural capital.
Modeling Social Capital
Social capital characterizes sympathetic relationships between economic agents that
generates the potential for preferential treatment that may alter the terms and levels of trade. 
The primary assumptions underlying social capital are that: 1) individuals may build sympathetic
relationships that have value; and 2) that the strengths of these relationships vary across agents. 
Earlier, existing models of altruism and/or club behavior are also capable of modeling exchanges
where relationships can influence economic behavior.  What distinguishes social capital from
altruism and club models is its attempts to specify the nature of these relationships based on
kernels of commonality between agents that are either earned or inherited.  The notion is that
social capital originates between agents who share similar views and interests, agents who have
shared similar experiences, or agents who are somehow related.  In all cases, the formation of5 5
max
x
























social capital requires the exchange of socio-emotional goods.  The advantage of social capital is
its ability to model the impacts of various types of relationships on economic behavior.
Define the social capital coefficient  Kij as the degree to which agent i sympathizes or
internalizes the well being of agent j.  In most instances, this coefficient is bounded by zero and
one, signaling agent i’s sympathy for agent j.  However, agent i may have neutral (Kij  = 0), or
antipathetic (Kij < 0) feelings toward j.  The coefficient Kij represents j’s social capital since j’s
ability to influence i’s decisions is related to i’s resources and the degree to which agent i
internalizes j’s well being.   
Social capital coefficient can be used to derive the distinct motivations included in social
capital models.  Consider, for example, agent i utility function defined over own and other
incomes and social capital coefficients.  The result is the utility function described in (1).
Agent i’s utility function described in (1) is assumed to be restricted by the availability of
resource x.
2  Here Ui and Uj are increasing and concave utility functions; and %i and %j are utility
attributes, such as income.  In general, agent i will choose x according to the following
condition:
Agent i chooses x in a way to maximize utility described in (1) by setting the sum of marginal
utilities in (2) equal to zero.  The first term is the marginal utility from own income and is
identical to the standard first-order condition in the neoclassical model assuming selfish6 6
preferences.  The second term is the marginal utility from increases in the agent j’s utility as a
results of changes in j’s income.  This is the pure altruism term and the sign and magnitude of
the term will depend on value of Kij, or agent j’s social capital.  Thus, the first two terms
characterize the typical altruism model.
3  Social capital concepts can be used to further specify
the structure of the model as will be demonstrated later.
The remaining three terms are related to changes in the level of social capital.  The third
term is marginal utility from changes in how agent i feels about himself.  This term is closely
related to Etzioni’s concept of a person’s moral dimension where agent i possesses a profile of
the ideal self based on values learned from parents, religious figures, people admired, and other
sources.   
The fourth is the marginal utility of changes in agent j’s social capital provided by agent






term is the marginal utility from changes in agent i’s social capital provided by agent j.  As






for providing sympathetic feeling for agent j and vice versus.
4   The social capital terms between
agent i and agent j allow us to model the impact of each agent’s "taste for association" that is
suggested in certain models of club behavior (Sandler and Tschirhart).  Adding additional
specification to the model will allow us to further examine the impacts of social capital on a
number of issues.
Modeling Behavior Under Risk
RMS recently introduced social capital into farmland models to demonstrate its role in
establishing minimum sell prices under certainty.  Their efforts support the models predictions7 7
V ￿ Ui(wi(x)) ￿ KijUj(wj(x)) (3)
wi(x) ￿ w
N
i (x) ￿ %i(x) if no bad event occurs
w
L
i (x) ￿ %i(x) ￿ Li(x) if bad event occurs
(4)
that social capital embedded in relationships alters both the terms and level of trades.  What has
not been modeled, nor tested, is the influence of social capital on risky investment.  To introduce
risk into social capital and test empirically the model’s predictions is the focus of what follows. 
We begin with the social capital model developed by RMS. 
Our focus here will be to extend the RMS model of social capital to explore how social
capital can alter responses to risk.  Consider the case where agent i’s actions impact agent j’s
income distribution.  For simplicity assume agent j’s social capital is fixed at Kij and that agent
i’s utility is generated as
where Ui and Uj are increasing and concave utility functions; wi and wj are the wealth level
realized by each agent; and x is some action chosen by agent i that might impact his own wealth
as well as agent j’s wealth.  So agent i’s level of satisfaction depends on both his utility level
from wealth and agent j’s utility level from wealth. 
Consider the situation where the agents operate in a world with risk characterized by a
single bad event.  Let   and   be the income levels under certainty which could depend %i(x) %j(x)
on the choice of x.  Now agent i’s wealth level can be written as

























j (x) ￿ %j(x) if no bad event occurs
w
L















Finally, suppose that conditions (e.g. accidents, natural disasters, deaths) will be such that the
bad events will occur with probability   and   which might also depend on x. pi(x) pj(x)
Agent i now chooses x to satisfy
So agent i behaves in a way to maximize own expected utility plus the weighted value of agent
j’s expected utility where the weight depends on the social distance between i and j.
Now consider the first-order condition that determines the optimal investment in x.  To























It is clear from (7) that agent i no longer simply maximizes expected utility from own income







































where the weight again depends on agent jt’s social capital.  Rearranging (7) we see that agent i
chooses x so that
In other words, agent i choose x so that the weighted marginal utility from own income and
agent j’s income equals the expected loss in marginal utility from the occurrence of the bad
outcome and the change in the probability of bad outcome occurring.  Here the bad outcome
impacts behavior through both changes in own income and agent j’s income, again depending on
agent j’s social capital.
We can use (7) to further examine the impacts of social capital on agent i’s responses to
risk.  Taking the total derivative we find
where H is the derivative of (7) with respect to x and is negative by the second-order condition. 
Equation (9) tells us what impact an exogenous change in Kij  will have on agent i’s investment. 
In general the sign of (9) is ambiguous and can not be signed without imposing more structure
on the problem facing agent i.   To further explore the sign of (9) we use the definition of   and ￿j











































It is clear from (10 that there are three factors that play a key role in determining the impact of
agent j’s social capital on agent i’s investment in x: 1) income effect, the change in agent j’s
income resulting from a change in x, ;  2)  loss effect, the change in the magnitude of loss as a
0%j
0x
result of a change in x,  ; and 3) risk effect, the change in the probability of a loss for agent j
0Lj
0x
as a result of a change in x,  .  Characterizing the nature of each of these factors for the
0pj
0x
particular problem facing agent i can help us understand the role of social capital in the
investment decision a risky asset.
Result 1. If increasing the investment in x by agent i increases (decreases) j’s income, then
the income effect from an increase in social capital coefficient Kij causes an
increase (decrease) in the optimal investment level of x.  The magnitude of the
income effect increases with the magnitude of the potential loss to agent j.
To demonstrate the income effect, consider the effect of an increase in  x on agent j’s










causes an increase (decrease) in the level of agent j’s income. 
























as  .  In other words, if x increases agent j’s income, then an increase in social
0%j
0x
>(<) ￿ 011 11
capital (i.e., increase in Kij) will increase investment in x.  However if x decreases agent j’s
income, then an increase in social capital will decrease the investment in x.  













the loss increases we see from (10) that the magnitude of the impact of an increase in social
capital on the investment in x will increase with the magnitude of the potential loss.
Result 2. If increasing the investment in x by agent i increases (decreases) in magnitude of
the potential loss faced by agent j, then the loss effect from an increase in social
capital coefficient Kij causes a decrease (increase) in the optimal investment level
of x.  The magnitude of the loss effect increases with the magnitude of the
potential loss and likelihood of the loss occurring.
Consider the impact of x on the magnitude of the potential loss faced by agent j in










(decreases) as the investment in x goes up.  Using (8) we see that  dx
dKij
>(<) ￿ 0




increase investment in x.  On the other hand, if x increases the size of the loss, an increase in







loss we see from (10) that the magnitude of the impact of social capital on the investment in x
will increase with both the magnitude of the potential loss and the likelihood of the loss
occurring.12 12
Result 3. If increasing the investment in x by agent i increases (decreases) the likelihood of
a loss to agent j, then the risk effect from an increase in social capital coefficient
Kij causes a decrease (increase) in the optimal investment level of x.  The
magnitude of the risk effect increases with magnitude of the potential loss.
To this, examine in isolation the impact of x on the likelihood of agent j experiencing the










increase (decrease) in the likelihood of the bad event occurring.  From (10) we see






will realize the bad event, then an increase in social capital will increase investment in x. 
However, if investment in x increases the likelihood of the bad event, then an increase in social
capital causes a decrease in x.  Because   increases with the size of the potential loss faced by ￿j
agent j, we see from (10) that the magnitude of the impact of change in social capital on the
investment in x will increase with magnitude of the potential loss.
Result 4. The impact on the investment of risky asset x by agent i resulting from a change
in social capital coefficient Kij depends on the combined income, loss, and risk
effects.  If a change in x causes the income, loss, and risk effects to impact
investment x in the same direction, then the impact of change in social capital on
the optimal investment  in x can be determined unambiguously.  Otherwise, the
magnitudes of each effect are necessary to determine the investment response to a




















>(<) ￿ 0 (11)
The combined income, loss, and risk effects in (10), determine the effect of a change in
the social capital coefficient Kij on risk investment x.  Consider the case where the choice of x
has no impact on agent j’s income level but increases the probability of the bad event and the










that the investment in x will decline as social increases,  .  Here agent i reduces the dx
dKij
<0
investment x because, as social capital increases, he/she places more weight on the increase in
potential loss to agent j and the increase in the likelihood of agent j experiencing a loss, as a
result of his/her actions.  Now suppose that increases in the investment in x decreases the










Here (10) shows that agent i will increase his investment in x as social capital




Sometimes the income, loss, and risk effects can work in opposite directions.  For
example, suppose that investment in x increases agent j’s income but also increases the










unable to predict how an increase in Kij will effect investment in x.  Agent i now wishes to
increase x to increase agent j’s income, but is reluctant to do so because at the same time an
increase in x will increase the probability that agent j will experience the loss.  In many cases, to
predict the effect of increase in Kij on x we need to measure the magnitudes of terms in (10). 14 14
In other words, if the gain in marginal utility from an increase in agent j’s income is greater than
(less than) the weighted increase in the likelihood of the bad event occurring, then the
investment level will increase (decline).
In total there are 27 possible combinations concerning the signs of the income, loss, and
risk terms.  Each of the possible combinations and the corresponding impact of social capital
investment in x,  , are shown in Table 1.  Fifteen of the possible cases produce an dx
dKij
unambiguous social capital effect on the investment in x.  In the remaining 12 ambiguous cases
the magnitudes are required to determine the impact of social capital on the investment level.
Measuring Risk Responses
A simple empirical study was conducted to illustrate of the interaction between risk and
relationships using a random sample of Michigan county extension agents.  The agents were
selected for the survey because a significant amount of their work requires travel and they are
sometimes asked to provide transportation services.  Thus they are accustomed to evaluating the
risk of an automobile accident.
A telephone survey resulted in 90 usable responses.  The respondents were asked to
report the most miles they would drive someone under various risk conditions.  Specifically,
they were asked to report the miles of free transportation they would be willing to provide
someone they didn’t like (Kij <0), a stranger (Kij = 0), and a friend (Kij > 0) under two different
types of weather: (1) sunny with clear roads; and (2) bad weather with snow on roads that was
not completely cleared.  To control for other factors influencing their responses, survey
respondents were also asked if they drove a 4-wheel drive vehicle, their gender, their age, and if
they carried car and life insurance.  In terms of (10), x represents the amount of free15 15
transportation provided.  When the extension agents provides the free transportation he/she is












capital on the amount of transportation provided is ambiguous in general and depends on
condition (11). If (11) for the extension agent is >(<) = 0, then  .  That is, if (9) is dx
dKij
>(<) ￿ 0
> 0, the income effect is greater (less) than the effect of increasing risk and the agent will
provide increasing (decreasing) amounts of transportation as social capital increases (decreases).
The impact of respondent characteristics and relationships on the willingness to drive was
analyzed using tobit regression since miles offered were bounded below by zero.  The model
regressed the level of miles offered on the respondent’s relationship to the passenger, the road
characteristics, whether the respondent owned a 4-wheel drive vehicle, the respondent’s gender,
and whether or not the respondent carried significant amounts of car and life insurance.  The
results of the tobit regression are reported in Table 2.
The constant term in Table 2 measures the miles offered if the request were from
someone the driver dislikes, the weather is good, the driver is a female without a 4-wheel drive
vehicle or insurance.  We find that the number of miles the respondents are willing to drive a
friend is greater than the number of miles they are willing to drive a stranger which, in turn, is
greater than the distance they will drive someone they dislike.  Respondents will drive a friend
(stranger) an average of 119 (42) miles further than someone they don’t like.  These results show
the income effect out weighs the risk effect for the agents (i.e., condition (11) is positive) and
provide clear support of the notion that relationships influence the respondent’s decision to
provide transportation services.16 16
On average, requests to drive under bad weather conditions (an exogenous shift in risk)
reduce the offer by 60 miles.  Meanwhile, the respondent’s age has little impact on the
willingness to drive.  Male drivers on average would be willing to offer nearly 43 miles more
than female drivers and owning a 4-wheel drive vehicle adds nearly 26 miles to the offer. 
Finally, carrying significant amounts of insurance adds nearly 20 miles to the distance
respondents would be willing to drive.  All of the coefficients in Table 2 were significant at the
one percent level or higher except the constant term and the age variable.
Summary and Conclusions
Social capital can be used to model the impacts of different types of relationships on
economic behavior.  Previous models of social capital and its influence on economic transactions
have focused on problems facing decision makers under certainty.  The results in this paper
extend previous work in this area by exploring the impacts of social capital on investment
behavior under risk using an expected utility framework.
The results, as expected, suggest that social capital increases the complexity of the
investment decision when the investment level influences the well being of the other agent with
whom social capital exists.  In the simply model considered here, the impacts of social capital on
the investment decision depends on how the investment effects the other agent’s income level
(income effect), potential loss in case of a bad event occurring (loss effect), and the likelihood of
a bad event occurring (risk effect).
In general the impact of social capital on investment under risk is ambiguous.  However,
the impact can be determined for many types of investments.  For example, it is shown that if the
investment has a positive income effect and negative loss and risk effects then an increase in17 17
social capital will increase the level of investment.  For some investments, the income, loss, and
risk effects are offsetting we need additional information on preferences and the income, loss,
and risk effects in order to determine the impact of social capital on the investment level.
To illustrate the impacts of social capital on behavior under risk, a sample of county
extension agents were asked how much free transportation they would provide someone under
risky driving conditions.  The investment in driving involved an income transfer to the other
agents, but also increased the risk of loss (in case of an accident) so the income and risk effects
were offsetting.  A prior, the impact of social capital on the amount transportation provided in
this case is ambiguous and must be measured empirically.  The results show the amount of
transportation provided by the extension agents would increase as the level of social capital
increases indicating that 1) social capital does impact economic behavior and 2) that the income
effect outweighed the risk effect for this investment.
This paper provides a simple framework that can be used to incorporate the effects of
social capital on economic behavior under risk.  Future work in this area might focus on
generalizing the risk model and/or incorporating other forms of social capital.  In addition, it
would be useful to empirically measure the impacts of social capital on many risky investment
decisions in the agriculture sector.18 18
Table 1.  Impact of Social Capital on the Level of Investment
Factors Change in Investment as Social
Capital Increases







Investment  0 0x
0 0Kij
=0 =0 =0 =0
=0 >0 =0 <0
=0 <0 =0 >0
>0 =0 =0 >0
>0 >0 =0 ?
>0 <0 =0 >0
<0 =0 =0 <0
<0 >0 =0 <0
<0 <0 =0 ?
=0 =0 >0 <0
=0 >0 >0 <0
=0 <0 >0 ?
>0 =0 >0 ?
>0 >0 >0 ?
>0 <0 >0 ?
<0 =0 >0 <0
<0 >0 >0 <0
<0 <0 >0 ?
=0 =0 <0 >0
=0 >0 <0 ?
=0 <0 <0 >0
>0 =0 <0 >0
>0 >0 <0 ?
>0 <0 <0 >0
<0 =0 <0 ?
<0 >0 <0 ?
<0 <0 <0 ?19 19
Table 2.  Tobit Analysis of Respondents’ Offer to Provide Transportation Services
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 2-Tail Significance
Constant -42.501 -.731 .0835
Friend 119.330 11.999 .0000
Stranger 41.747 4.141 .0000
Risk -60.392 -7.648 .0000
Age -.075 -0.174 .8621
Gender 42.677 4.029 .0001
4-Wheel Drive Vehicle 25.523 2.705 .0068
Insurance 19.885 1.151 .249720 20
1. Social capital is partly fungible because providing socio-emotional goods generally requires
personalized social capital.  A friend of a friend may provide us access to physical goods and
services on preferential terms to please our common friend.  However this same friend of a
friend is likely unable to provide us socio-emotional goods because these require a
personalized relationship that doesn’t exist.  Similarly, human capital is only partly fungible
because we do not permit slavery or involuntary servitude.
2. The utility function could be specified in other ways.  For example, it is possible that Uj
contains the arguments %i and Kij.  In this case if i can act in a way to increase his/her social
capital, Kji, he/she may increase his/her potential for preferential treatment from agent j.
3. See O. Stark for a detail study of altruism and its applications to within family transfers.
4. For a more detailed discussion of the five motives see Robison and Schmid (1996).
Endnotes21 21
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